Chapter 4 - Democratization by Foreign Intervention

The previous chapters showed the historical and cultural context of emergence of Afghan warlordism and their present military, political, and economic predominance. These were internal country-specific conditions which enabled the warlordisation of the new democratic regime. Henceforth we shall enter domains characteristic for a number of post-conflict countries, which are related to international practices of foreign interventions. Two aspects of interventionism will be assessed next: this chapter will focus on the concept of “democracy by force” (Watts 2005), and chapter 5 will examine the state-building and democratization paradigms as practiced by the international community today.

The US-led military intervention in Afghanistan delineated the beginning of the UN-led democratization process. The foreign military regime change will show as yet another condition which favoured the creation of a warlord democracy as the economically most viable model of interventionism. Post-conflict elections will be examined as a means of institutionalizing and legitimizing warlord democracies, reframing chapter 1 within the context of foreign influence and local militancy.

4.1. Democracy by Force

Although the question of the right to impose a regime on a foreign state is debatable from legal and ethical point of view, the fact is that it happens, it has happened in numerous cases in recent history, and it is likely to happen in future, with or without approval of international law, the global community, the intervening state’s public opinion or the intervened citizens. It is a recurrent historical phenomenon, changing the degree and the form of intervener’s role in the intervened state, from simple conquest, through colonialism, the Cold War foreign regime changes, and post-Cold War. While the Cold War was marked by either anti-communist or anti-capitalist fears, the post-Cold War period has concentrated on control of the free market, control over natural energy resources, and lately anti-terrorist and, some believe, anti-Islamist fears.

The following discussion will exclude economic analysis of the possible motives behind the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan and conspiracy theories that “inside every U.S. foreign policy there lies a small oil-interest just waiting to be released.” Given that this intervention already took place and is irretrievable, the question of justified (or not) intervention is useless a posteriori for Afghanistan, and the question what to do next in intervened states becomes significant both for the country in question and for the international community involved in state building and democratization.

6.1.1. Democratization as Security Policy

The concept of democratization as a security-related foreign policy, promoted in Afghanistan, is based on the observation that democracies rarely go to war against each other, whereupon one of the authors of this democratic peace theory, Bruce Russet , expressed bitter disagreement when their theory was used to justify waging wars. It is common that politicians would use theories from political science and international relations to find multidimensional reasons and justifications for sending (or not) troops to topple a foreign regime. However, scientists’ justifications and predictions for foreign-led regime change vary to a large degree. Watts (2005) describes three main lines of thinking: realist, liberal and critical theorist approach to “democracy by force:”

The realist approach holds that the attempt is likely to fail, it is far too expensive in terms of funds and human lives, and it provokes hostility in local and international actors. Realists are also highly critical of the institutional approach to promoting democracy, which does not influence the underlying power relations inherent in the society in question. Liberals advocate “democracy by force”, believing that democracy is the only sound basis for military, economic and political stability. Some liberals are not optimistic toward the outcomes of such interventions. Critical theorists are far less optimistic than realists and liberals; they claim that Western states tend to blindly project their own problems and solutions (histories, values, institutions) onto other, culturally different countries, and impose a “one-size-fits-all” programme of regime change where the intervener’s institutions are disseminated regardless to local history or culture.

4.1.2. Democratization as Ends or Means

One positive test for the prevalent motives of imposing democracy on another state can put to the ritualistic “first-election” step: whether the intervener only makes elections possible or they heavily influence the outcome to serve their own national interests in the intervened country. The main Afghan intervener, the U.S., has a long history of clandestine toppling of regimes, manipulating political outcomes, open military interventions, and support to friendly autocrats. The U.S. Administration, according to Carothers (2004:64) , suffers from a “split personality”: one - realist, befriending autocratic rulers who guarantee non-democratic stability to fulfil American economic and security interests; and the other – neo-Reaganite, demanding (or enforcing) democratization around the globe. This causes doubts about the legitimacy of contemporary “democratization by force” and it defames democratization effort.

The U.S. activities in Afghanistan to a significant level were aimed at determining the outcome of the elections and the appointment of key governmental officials, starting from the interim and later on legally elected President. The influence on the electoral outcome, to recount the indications from chapter 1, was probably performed by covert funnelling of large amounts of money directly to the preferred candidate (used for bribe and campaigning), through American non-governmental organizations, by funding local media and campaigns; by buying out potential opponents and through coercive alliances with them, using the U.S. military forces as leverage.

While democratization by foreign intervention may be considered as a potentially legitimate goal in some cases, interfering in the outcomes of democratic processes can hardly be seen as such. The intervener’s protégés are also unlikely to gain or maintain popular support, and manipulated elections are a shortcut to disillusionment in democracy amongst the local population. Carothers (2004:71) warns on the long-term negative effects of “wrapping security goals in the language of democracy promotion and then confusing democracy promotion with the search for particular political outcomes that enhance those security goals.” In the international community, the instrumentalization of democracy promotion for achievement of security (and economic benefits) is also not likely to be lauded. Perhaps most importantly, the local community is likely to lose faith in the democratic promise and trust in the international community.

4.1.3. Mechanisms of Failure

In many cases, the introduction of democracy resembles “either pragmatic or desperate experiments rather than expressions of deeply felt aspirations of ‘the people’,” estimates Thomas Carothers (2004:13) the not-so-bright history of democratizing countries. Why does not imposed democracy take root?

Stephen Watts (2005) criticizes the concept of regime change by external intervention on the ground of its likely consequences. Regardless to the motivations of the intervener, a larger or smaller part of the population will tend to perceive themselves as occupied and shift their support to local military commanders or nationalistic leaders as to their sole representatives; the latter may lead them into a liberation war against the intervener or into a civil war between forces loyal to the intervener and those against them. The intervened population is not likely to accept imposed authority structures, so that the intervener is frequently compelled to use force in an effort “to fit square pegs into round holes” (Etzioni 2004: 3).  Any use of force by the foreign troops, whether in self-defence, in protection of civil rights or against local insurgents, is likely to be interpreted as illegitimate and unproportional, to signal a common enemy to the local actors, and motivate growing civil dissatisfaction or resistance.

If foreign military presence is unaccepted by the population, local militant leaders may come to be perceived as defenders of their communities, and interventions against them can backlash with popular insurgency and escalating spirals of violence. This is the mechanism of producing local warlords, Watts explains. Interventions usually fail to address the underlying causes of instability, and thus are quick to lose popular support. Moreover, local leaders are put in position to legitimize and increase their power in conditions of continued instability, and they may perceive insignificant gain from cooperation with the interveners.

Even citizens may benefit from warlord regimes, and it is the citizens who give support, continuity and legitimacy to any sort of rule. Introducing a set of democratic institutions in a country does not imply favour or compliance from the wide populace. Moreover, it is realistic to assume that the citizens would attempt to adjust institutions to their societal beliefs, values, interests and patterns of behaviour. Conflict-ridden countries are characterized by damaged social values and patterns, mistrust and anarchy; liberty is typically associated with freedom to abuse others, power with violence, and cooperation with destruction; or isolationism and apathy prevail.

A society formerly under an illegitimate (unaccepted) regime will tend to be distrustful toward a new one, even if it is called democracy, and the pattern of behaviour will largely tend to appropriate and personalize the democratic regime, or work its ways against, despite or heedless to institutions and laws. Such states sometimes draw exasperated opinions among domestic experts and international academics that a “strong hand” is need to set the society up and running again, an advice which is likely to produce a “strong-handed” autocracy or oligarchy.

Another objection goes against the assumption that democracy is a universal aspiration and a universal good, especially when its practices go against or regardless to non-Western cultural orders and differences. Democracy is an ideology (Carothers 2004:19-20), and imposing it by coercion brings out its ideological limitations and cultural particularities. Foreign interventions including regime-imposition are especially disputable when one state assumes that it can judge what institutional form in what value frame can be the best for another society. However, Watts (2005) notes that in case of regime change by foreign military intervention, the intervener will tend to install its own regime in the intervened state, for better or worse. Regimes tend to propagate themselves, and autocracies will attempt to install or beget autocracies, while democracies will attempt to install or beget democracies. From this perspective, democratization is an expression of the Western dominant discourse, prone to suffering from cultural insensitivity and legitimized manipulation.

Economic Perspective of Foreign Interventionism

Military engagement as means of building a liberal regime has been discussed with overwhelming scepticism amongst political scientists not only for its ethical contradictions, but also for its cost-ineffective consequences.  Stephen Watts claims that the high costs of longer and more committed interventions lead the intervening state to decrease these costs by entering power-sharing arrangements with local military leaders, promising them political power regardless to their background and agenda. Then, this promise is legitimized and institutionalized through the first post-conflict elections, whereupon the intervener can disengage from open conflict, having established military and political influence in the intervened state. “From the standpoint of the intervener, competitive oligarchy thus represents the lowest-cost form of intervention,” Watts (2005) claims. Competitive oligarchies, or warlord democracies, as he names them, are considered to be the only lasting and economically viable outcome, although characterized by continuous low-intensity violence.

This arrangement, I should add, is viable so long as the actors profit from a weak state without having to fight for supreme control, and without having to take the full responsibility a strong state should assume in relation to its citizens. Wolfgang Merkel  (2004) elaborates on the issue of stability of such “defective democracies,” with their defects being perceived by governing elite and population not as transitional phases, but as instrumental: “As long as this equilibrium between problems, context and power lasts, defective democracies will survive for protracted periods of time,” (2004:33). I shall conclude that, in case of Afghanistan, a defective democracy is likely to remain stable so long as local warlords are satisficied with the extracted profits from the intervening parties, the opium market, the weak state, and so long as their positions are not challenged.

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